What Is Socrates Counterexample to Cephalus Definition of Justice

57Socrates himself is dissatisfied at the end of Book I, and he seems to implicitly acknowledge that his arguments—especially the latter—rest on premises that Thrasymachus finds dubious and that even sympathetic but fair readers are more willing to support. In addition, Socrates recognizes a flaw in his procedure: he began to deal with the second question of the Republic, whose life is happier, before answering the first question about the nature of justice. This is a moment of typical Socratic insight: “The result of the discussion, as far as I am concerned, is that I know nothing, because if I do not know what justice is, I will hardly know whether it is some kind of virtue or not, or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy” (1.354c). 39Thrasymachus articulates here immoralism, the idea that what most people think is the wrong way to act is in fact the right way: what is conventionally considered to be defects of character are in fact virtues. Unlike the conventionalism previously expressed by Thrasymachus, immoralism is a realistic view: there are mind-independent moral facts that provide standards by which the conventions and norms of a society can be evaluated. Athenian culture regards justice as a virtue and injustice as a vice. Here, Thrasymachus says that Athenian culture does this backwards, since injustice is really virtue and justice is vice. In this article, the author will examine justice by highlighting Socrates of Cephalus` critique and Polemarchus` view of the concept. To this end, the author will address two central issues. These include the view of justice, which forms the basis of Socrates` critique, and why the philosopher found the definitions and views of justice of Cephalus and Polemamarch unsatisfactory. In response to Socrates` call for persuasion, Polemarchus jokingly plays a trump card: “But could you convince us if we don`t listen?” (1.327e). Plato here recognizes a practical limit to the power of rational persuasion: those who refuse to listen cannot be convinced.

Most of us have probably met people who seem impervious to evidence and arguments. Even more frightening, psychologists Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler have identified what they call the flashback effect: Some of us are psychologically constituted in such a way that not only do we remain convinced of the evidence and reasons that should lead us to abandon certain beliefs, but we actually tend to have such beliefs even more strongly in the face of such evidence – so that attempts, 2 Plato reminds us that true discussion and dialogue, unlike dueling monologues, cannot take place if we refuse to find reasons and evidence that contradict our views. It tackles an important theme that will be at work in the background of the Republic, in a subtle way as experienced literary artists do. The fate of Polemarchus is not uncommon among Plato`s characters: they realize that Socrates has cornered them intellectually, but they do not seem to know what to do. Adeimantus describes the experience of many of Socrates` interlocutors later in the Republic: “Just as inexperienced ladies are caught by experts at the end and cannot make a move, so [your interlocutors] are trapped at the end and have nothing to say in this other kind of queen, which is not played with records but with words” (6.487b). 1The last half of Book I (336a-354c) describes Socrates` encounter with Thrasymachus. Like most characters in the Republic, Thrasymachus is a real person, and Plato`s views are consistent with what is known about historical Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus is a sophist – a professional and itinerant teacher of rhetoric or the art of persuasion. Plato`s concern for the Sophists is that their teaching is neither based on nor intended for truth; Their only concern is persuasion. 52 Although the common purpose argument is well founded, it does not appear to prove what it was intended to prove. It is a pity that Thrasymachus` wounded pride prevents him from questioning the common purpose argument.

Had he done so, Socrates might have given up, or perhaps he would have regrouped after reflection and replied that the argument at least shows that Thrasymachus` immoralism is false. Finally, Thrasymachus thinks that injustice is a virtue and that justice is a vice because the former allows and the latter prevents its owner from attaining happiness: immoralism implies that injustice is stronger than justice. By showing that the opposite is true, that justice is stronger than injustice, Socrates shows that immoralism is evil. Even if the common purpose argument comes to the erroneous conclusion about the nature of justice, it is still a blow to Thrasymachus` immoralism. Well, I`ve never done that. No, I probably won`t. Do you know what you want? Now that the structure of P1 has been clarified, Polemarchus has a good answer to Socrates. His admission that C and D are both wrong no longer means that A is wrong (i.e., his definition of justice is incorrect). Instead, C and D`s lie makes A false or B is false (and maybe both). And we have independent reasons to think that B is wrong: virtues of character like justice are in many ways like craftsmanship, but they are not craft because craftsmanship is morally neutral, while virtues of character (and vices) are morally charged.

It should be noted how, at the end of this chapter, Socrates attempts to preserve the moral authority of the poet Simonides, whose definition Polemarchus invoked when he entered the conversation. When Polecus first enters the discussion, Socrates describes Simonides as “a wise and divine man” (1,333e) – though perhaps somewhat ironically. A few pages later, after decisively refuting the definition, as he believes, he suggests that the definition could not be Simonides` after all, for no wise and divine man could be so wrong about the nature of justice. Instead, it must be the definition of a rich and powerful person trying to hide their bad behavior in the mantle of justice.